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Montana Law Review
VOLUME VIII.

SPRING, 1947

Insanity and the Criminal
Law in Montana
RUSSELL SMITH*
Any study of insanity in its relation to the criminal law
involves two separate and distinct concepts. The first, that
an insane person is not criminally responsible for his act is,
as presently treated a moral problem, the solution of which
reguires an inquiry into the defendant's capacity at the time
of the offense to entertain a criminal intent. The second, that
a person should not be tried, adjudged or punished while insane, is essentially a question of fair procedure and involves
the ability of the accused to understand the nature of the proceedings against him and conduct his defense in a rational
manner. These concepts have deep roots in the Anglo-Saxon
law and both of them are expressed in the statutes of Montana.' The inquiry into the mental capacity of the defendant
to be tried for crime is different from the inquiry into his responsibility for it, both as regards the time to which the inquiry is directed and the kind of mental qualities involved.
The distinction is well recognized by the courts."
The statutory definitions of insanity in Montana are valueless for any purpose' and nowhere in the statutes is any indi*Assistant Professor of Law. Montana State University, L.L.B., 1981.
1R.C.M. 1935, §12213 and §10729.
'People v. Perry (1939) 14 Cal. (2d) 387, 94 Pac. (2d) 559; State v.
Henke (1938) 196 Wash. 185, 82 Pac. (2d) 544.
8R.C.M. 1935, §10729 provides: "All persons are capable of committing

crimes except those belonging to the following classes: . . . 2. Idiots.
3. Lunatics and Insane persons . . ." R.C.M. 1935, §10727 provides In

part: "All persons are of sound mind who are neither idiots nor
lunatics, nor affected with insanity."
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cation given that there is a difference between the kinds of
insanity involved in the two concepts mentioned. The Supreme Court has not yet drawn the distinction although when
the problem is directly raised it must necessarily do so. The
fact that it has not been clearly stated to date has resulted in
some unfortunate confusion in the law of Montana.
Some of the problems presented by these concepts will be
treated in this article. It may be here said that those surrounding the trial of insane persons are largely procedural in
character and can be resolved for the most part by the court
while those involved in the determination of criminal responsibility are largely social in character and can be dealt with only
by the legislature.
I.
INSANITY AS A DEFENSE
The concept that an insane person is not criminally responsible presents two main problems: First, how should
criminal responsibility be measured, and second, what sort of
a tribunal should do the measuring? The answer to these
problems would not be so difficult if the social function of
the criminal law were clear and generally accepted. Unfortunately this is not the case.
The retributive theory is still the dominant one in the
Montana scheme of criminal law. The criminal is first determined to be guilty, following which punishment is assessed. The severity of the punishment is gauged by the
gravity of the offense committed, although the court may,
within limits, exercise some measure of discretion. Other influences have made some impression on Montana law. Where
juveniles are concerned the process is almost entirely corrective and the whole parole system indicates some compromise.
Nevertheless the primary emphasis is upon punishment. The
law of insanity as presently disclosed by the statutes and decisions, is consistent with the whole body of the criminal law.
The present legal definition of insanity in Montana is at
least 100 years old, and in its origins much older than that.
The philosophy of the Christian church which taught that man
was a free moral agent, with full power to accept or reject,
to submit to or resist temptation, undoubtedly influenced our
law in its beginnings. The doctrine of free will being accepted,
persons who violated the generally accepted moral dogmas
were properly subject to punishment.
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In the case of insane people, however, the case was different since the insane were afflicted by God and hence were not
free moral agents. For the purpose of determining whether
in a given case a man was criminally responsible for his acts,
it seems almost inevitable that the right and wrong test should
have been accepted. If we accept the doctrine of free will,
then it can be quite logically said that he who can distinguish
between right and wrong is morally responsible, while he who
cannot so distinguish is not responsible. At any rate, in the
year 1843 in the celebrated McNaughten case' the justices of
England verbalized the right and wrong test, saying in substance, that an accused to establish the defense of insanity must
show that he was laboring under such a defect of reason, from
a disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of
the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not
know he was doing what was wrong. This view was generally
accepted in England and America and today represents the law
in Montana.
In this state, the Supreme Court in 1899, in the case of
State v. Peelr announced the definitions of insanity which still
measure criminal responsibility where insanity is a defense.
The court adopted the general theory of the McNaughten case,
and said that every crime involves the union of act and intent
and that where the defendant lacks the capacity to distinguish
between right and wrong there can be no intent. The court
went somewhat farther and adopted what it called the more humane and advanced doctrine of "irresistible impulse." Under
this rule, even if the defendant had the capacity to distinguish
between right and wrong, he still might be found not guilty if
he could establish that he acted under an irresistible impulse.
The irresistible impulse rule was, however, limited in its application to insane persons, the court specifically saying that the
law "makes all sane persons responsible for their impulses."
It is not clear from the opinion whether by the application of
the right and wrong test, insanity is determined or whether insanity must first be determined and then the right and wrong
test applied to measure the degree of insanity which renders a
man irresponsible. No general definition of insanity is given
apart from the language which measures criminal responsibility
in terms of the right and wrong test. It is not clear how a jury
can determine whether a man acting under an irresistible im'(1843) 10 Clark & Fin. 200.
a(1899) 23 Mont. 358, 59 Pac. 169.
"State v. Narich (1932) 92 Mont. 17, 9 Pac. (2d) 477.
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pulse is sane. One would normally suppose that by definition,
the will would be overcome before there, could be an irresistible
impulse and that once a jury found that the will had been overcome, there could be no finding of sanity. The court speaks of
an irresistible impulse arising from a "disordered mind." Does
anything but a disordered mind have an irresistible impulse and
is not a disordered mind an insane mind ? It may be that the
court conceived of the will as a separate compartment of the
nervous system which could be overcome without affecting the
"mind" which had its existence in some other compartment.
Since, when dealing with the irresistible impulse rule, the right
and wrong test has already been excluded, it is clear that the
jury must find some general insanity or disease of the mind
before it can make application of the irresistible impulse rule.
There is no guide by which the jury may determine this general insanity. The manner in which the court uses the phrase
"disease of the mind" gives the impression of a brain crawling
with bacteria. In any event, the language of the Peel case leads
to a legal cul de sac. The difficulties which the Montana Court
has had in keeping the various definitions of insanity consistent are pointed out in a comment in the Montana Law Review'.
This type of decision has been bitterly denounced by the
psychiatrists who say that the legal definitions of insanity are
completely meaningless and that the words used by the courts
have no relationship to the medical aspects of insanity. They
decry the attempt by the courts to measure moral faculty, saying that the concept itself has long since been discarded by
students of the mind. These criticisms would be entirely justified were the problem purely medical or psychiatric, but as
has been pointed out, it is more complex than that. The problem is, what does a present society, not a more enlightened future society, want to do with the criminally insane. To what
extent does society want to reprieve the insane defendant from
punishments which are visited upon sane ones. So long as the
concept of punishment plays a substantial role in our criminal
law, the criticisms are not too important.
Under present constitutional provisions", the issue of in'Volume I. No. 1, P. 69.

CONST. Art. III, 123. Attempts to divest the jury of the power
to determine the insanity issue in criminal cases, in states having con.
stitutional provisions similar to Montana's, have been held unconstitutional. State v. Lange (1929) 168 La. O8, 123 So. 639, 67 A.L.R.
1447; State v. Strasburg (1910) 60 Wash. 106, 32 L.R.A. (n. s.) 1216,
110 Pac. 1020, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 917.

'Moir.
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sanity must be determined by a jury. The picture presented
to a jury in insanity cases where the insanity is not readily
apparent is of such character that a jury cannot possibly make
any precise evaluation or form any judgments according to
narrow definitions. The significant facts in a case history
escape the untrained mind. Expert testimony, couched as it
is in a strange terminology and sometimes based on premises
not generally understood, is necessarily confusing. The opinions of lay witnesses, except in extreme cases, furnish indirect
and inconclusive facts, such as "he seemed upset," "he wasn't
normal," and "his face was pale and his eyes seemed strange."
Where there is a conflict in the evidence the confusion is multiplied. The experts themselves are handicapped by lack of adequate case histories and opportunity to observe and are frustrated by the moulds into which their opinions must fall. Under these circumstances is it possible that the jury can fit the
evidence according to any but the roughest of patterns. The
capacity of a jury, for obvious reasons, is not a subject which
admits of dogmatism because there is no possible method of
judging it, but it is inconceivable that the untrained mind can
absorb a mass of testimony thrown at it in a short time and
then evaluate it according to any precise standards. The
average juror probably is not interested in the defendant's
capacity to understand the differences between right and
wrong, but rather in whether according to his individual
standards of right and wrong, the defendant should be punished. To reach his conclusion he views the crime, the manner in which it was committed and the evidence of insanity
all together and then reaches a result, based not on instructions defining insanity, but upon his own notions of justice".
Given identical evidence of insanity, would not the outraged
husband be apt to fare better with a jury than would the lover,
in a murder case arising out of the typical triangle? Were
the jury instructed that if they found the defendant crazy,
"wing-ding" or "loony", they must acquit, the results would

9S. Sheldon Glueck, in his work

MENTAL DisoaDERs

AND THE CRIMINAL

LAw has this to say: "The author has sometimes wondered at the
naivete of some writers on the criminal law, who seem to assume that
in the vast majority of cases, after listening for days to a mass of
conflicting, intricate, and confusing testimony, to a series of hypothetical questions, and a long, frequently confusing, if not contradictory, trial-judge's charge, a jury of untrained laymen can retire to the
cloistral calm of a stuffy jury room and contemplate on the judge's
words of legal wisdom, deciding the case in strict accordance with the
formal tests of criminal irresponsibility applicable to insanity cases."
(MENTAL DisoRDEas AND THE CRIMINAL LAW, p. 108)
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vary but little from those now obtained. This, of course, is heresy
to a profession which has with relative complacency seen jury
verdicts reversed because of faulty definitions of the "reasonable man" and "a reasonable doubt."
It might be urged that for precisely these reasons, the
question of insanity should be tried by experts who are capable
of evaluating evidence of insanity. Again, however, the problem is what do we want our criminal law to accomplish? If
the problem of crime is to remain a moral' problem, the jury
is quite as able to make the judgment as is the expert, because its reactions to the moral issues are closer to those of
society than are those of the expert'1. A jury verdict would
reflect, roughly, the general consensus of public opinion while
the experts verdict would reflect the narrow consensus of
trained opinion. As a specific example, the psychologist is
much more tolerant of abnormal sex crimes than is the layman. He knows that the homo-sexual, because of his nervous
make-up cannot satisfy the sex drives as does the hetro-sexual
and he appreciates the tensions upon which the homo-sexual
lives. To the psychologist, the homo-sexual is a medical problem; to the layman he is a moral problem. Results obtained
by a board of experts would be apt to differ widely from
those obtained by a layman's jury where sex crimes were concerned, and it is probable that the jury's results would be
more acceptable to the public than would the expert's. There
is some virtue in a system which accomplishes popular results,
since after all the stability of our institutions is to some extent
dependent upon public acceptance of them.
For these reasons it is submitted that the present system
of trying the insanity issue and the present definitions of insanity are consistent with the dominant philosophy of our
criminal law. Certainly there is very little that the courts can
'The word "moral" is used throughout in the sense of the difference
between right and wrong as expressed by the general body of community opinion. In the average criminal case the word "moral" as
here used. is almost synonymous with the word "legal." The difference between the words is found in the fact that a jury may while
applying certain community values go beyond the boundaries fixed by
the law. Where there is a conviction the error may. if the evidence
is not conflicting, be detected. Where there is an acquittal it never is.
"J. C. Turner in an essay THE MENTAL ELEMENT IN CRIMES published in
THE MODERN APPROACH TO THE CRIMINAL LAW, McMillan and Co. Ltd.
(1945) puts the problem rather interestingly. "In the case of insanity,
then, it appears not only that we still retain a moral standard for
liability but also that this moral standard is objective in the sense that
it Is not the actual moral standard of the accused person, but the
moral standard of the tribunal by whom he is tried." THE MENTAL
ELEMENT IN CRIMES at p. 223.
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do about it. In the interests of stability, the Supreme Court
should fix upon a definition of insanity and adhere to it.
Much more than that it cannot do.
Much could be done by the legislature. The problem of
insanity in criminal law is but a small segment of the whole
problem of insanity. At present Montana is not equipped to
deal with the non-criminally insane. We do not have either
the staff or the physical plant to cope with the increasing demands". Until these are provided, the core of the problem as
regards either the criminally or non-criminally insane cannot
be touched. When sufficient trained personnel have been secured and an adequate physical plant has been built then it
would be well to provide for a general screening of all persons accused of crime". Today the emphasis on insanity in the
field of criminal law is all too much on the spectacular murder,
spiced up with sex, where insanity is raised by the accused as
a "last ditch" defense. No attempt is made to discover the
psychologically maladjusted persons who, because of their
maladjustment, are involved in the less sensational crimes.
Many of the garden variety inmates of our jails and penitentiaries could probably be rehabilitated were their conditions
known and were adequate treatment available". These are
matters for the general public.
In the broader field the work of the criminologists, penologists and sociologists seems to be gaining ground and it is
possible that at some future time the "eye for an eye and tooth
for a tooth" philosophy will cease to be the primary consideration in criminal matters. When that time comes there will be
but one standard for the treatment of the criminal: "How can
this man best be treated for the general good of society?".
Then the criminal rather than the crime will be judged and
the treatment will fit the criminal rather than the crime.
Then the psychologist and psychiatrist rather than the judge
will play the predominant role. Then at least as much time
will be spent on determining what treatment should be used
as is spent on finding out whether the accused did the act for
which he is charged. These things lie very far in the future.
No. 1 OF 'THE GovERNOR's COMMITTEE ON
REoRoANlzAECONOMY discloses the deficiencies in our State insane
Asylum as of August, 1941.
The State of Massachusetts pioneered a law of this type which has
been widely vraised by students of this subject. AcTs AND RESOLVES,
(1921) Ch. 415.
A"There are about 100 inmates (in the state prison) who in the opinion
of lay persons on the staff are or may be psychotic." REPORT No. 20.

"REPoRT

TION AND

GOVERNOR'S COMMr 11

ON REORGANIZATION AND ECONOMY, p. 20.
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II.
PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THE DETERMINATION OF
INSANITY AT THE TIME OF TRIAL,
SENTENCE AND PUNISHMENT.
The general procedure for the trial of the issue of present
capacity is outlined by the code and no purpose would be
served by the reiteration of the applicable statutes. Hence
only the problems raised by them will be dealt with. Some of
the general social considerations are mentioned in the sections
of this article dealing with the problems of criminal responsibility.
A.

THE RIGHT OF THE DEPENDENT TO A JURY TRIAL WHERE
THE ISSUE IS RAISED DURING THE TRIAL.

When a doubt arises as to the sanity of the defendant during a trial, the court is required to submit the issue to a jury
other than the one trying the criminal charge'. The determination of whether a doubt has arisen is within the province of the
trial judge". The limit of the judge's discretion has not been
clearly defined. In all cases where the question has arisen, the
Supreme Court has affirmed the refusal of the trial court to
submit the question to a jury. In these cases the evidence was
very weak so far as can be determined from the court's opinions. The court has indicated that the discretion of the trial
court to determine the existence of a doubt is very wide and the
language of some of the cases implies that the trial court has a
discretion equivalent to that which it exercises when it makes
findings of fact on conflicting evidence in civil actions. Thus,
in the Peterson case the court said:
"But such a doubt does not necessarily present itself by the
mere assertion of the defendant that he is insane, or even
by introduction of witnesses on the trial who swear they do
not believe him to be of sound mind. The question whether
MR.C.M. 1935. 112214 provides: "When an action is called for trial, or
at any time during the trial or when the defendant isbrought up for
judgment on conviction, if a doubt arises as to the sanity of the defendant, the court must order the question as to his sanity to be submitted to a jury, which must be drawn and selected as in other cases;
and the trial or the pronouncing of the Judgment must be suspended
until the question is determined by their verdict, and the trial jury
may be discharged or retained, according to the discretion of the court,
during the pendency of the Issue of insanity."
"State v. Vettere (1926) 77 Mont. 66, 249 Pac. 666; State v. Schlaps
(1927) 78 Mont. 560, 254 Pac. 858; State v. Howard, (1904) 30 Mont.
518, 77 Pac. 50; State v. Peterson (1900) 24 Mont. 81, 60 Pac. 809.
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a doubt exists is one that addresses itself peculiarly to the
sound discretion of the trial court. To it must be presented
the reasons for asking that such an inquiry be had, or of its
own motion the court may institute the investigation, and
to its own sound judgment is left the decision of the wisdom of having it."
In the Howard case, the following language, which was later
used in the Vettere case, appears:
"Unless there be a doubt in the mind of the judge a quo-a
doubt which he must legally determine as he would determine any other matter of grave import before him-he will
not be warranted in calling a special jury to try the issue."
Results justifying the use of such language have been
reached in other states having similar statutory provisions.
Thus, in California, a judge who refused to submit the issue of
sanity to the jury was upheld in a case where the evidence before the court showed the defendant to be insane, and the only
basis for a contrary conclusion was found in the opportunity
which the trial court had to observe the defendant'7 .
In a later case, the trial court's discretion was upheld where
the evidence in support of the insanity consisted of affidavits
from two physicians and officers working in the jail, while the
contrary evidence consisted of counter affidavits, the contents
of which are not disclosed in the opinion.
There is, of course, a limit to the trial court's discretion",
but even in cases where the trial courts have been held to have
abused their discretion, the broad language of the Montana
cases is used. In the cases last noted, the evidence of insanity
was very strong, there was no evidence offered to contradict it,
and it is highly probable that a jury verdict of sanity would not
have been affirmed.
Notwithstanding the language used by the courts, it would
seem that under the statute there is a substantial difference between the function of the judge and the function of the jury,
and that the former was not intended to be coextensive with the
latter. Any creditable evidence given by competent witnesses
should be sufficient to create a "doubt." Certainly there should
be a doubt if, from the evidence presented, a jury could reason"People v. Kirby (1911)
'People v. Keyes (1918)
"OPeople v. Vester (1933)
denied by the Supreme
Pae. 377.

15 Cal. App. 264, 114 Pac. 794.
178 Cal. 794, 175 Pac. 6.
135 Cal. App. 223, 26 Pac. (2d) 685, rehearing
Court; Fralick v. State, (1923) 25 Ariz. 4, 212
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ably find that the defendant was insane. Can a judge say that
there is no doubt about a defendant's insanity if a competent
physician says that there is? Can people trained only in the law
say that there is no doubt in a case where competent medical
authorities disagree? The decisions indicate that they may.
While this result may be expedient and may prevent useless
trials of the insanity question, and while the judge may be
quite as competent as the jury to determine the question, nevertheless the statute, vesting the power of 'decision in the jury,
seems to have been emasculated by judicial amendment.
The provision providing for trial of the issue of insanity at
the time of judgment is duplicated in the codes.' Section 12065
could be construed as requiring a slightly stronger showing than
Section 12214 because of the difference :in the language employed. It would seem, however, that any attempt to provide a
different standard of proof at the time of sentence than is required during the trial would only result in a labyrinth of
words.
It is interesting to note that in none of the cases decided by
the Montana Supreme Court was the difference between the two
basic concepts of insanity, pointed out in the opening paragraphs
of this article, suggested by counsel or mentioned by the court.
B. WHERE THE ISSUE IS RAISED AFTER THE SENTENCE OF
DEATH.

A separate treatment is given the problem of present capacity when raised after the judgment of death.' In that case the
sheriff, with the concurrence of the judge, may submit the question of defendant's insanity to a jury. While the word "may"
is used in Section 12095, it is probable that in view of Section
12213, the sheriff must submit the issue to a jury, and the
judge must concur in that submission where there is good reason
to suppose that the defendant has become insane. The problem
here, however, is similar to the one previously discussed, in that
R.C.M. 1935, 112214 and 112065: The latter section provides in part as
follows: "He (the defendant) may show, for cause against the Judgment-1. That he is Insane; and If, In the opinion of the court, there
is reasonable ground for believing him to be insane, the question of
insanity must be tried as provided In sections 12213 to 12219 of this
code."
2PMC.M. 1935, 112095 provides as follows: "If. after Judgment of death,
there Is good reason to suppose that the defendant has become insane,
the sheriff of the county, with the concurrence of the judge of the
court by which the judgment was rendered, may summon from the list
of Jurors selected for the year, a jury of twelve persons to inquire into
the supposed insanity, and must give Immediate notice thereof to the
county attorney of the count"."
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the limit of the discretion to be exercised by the sheriff and the
judge has not been defined. The section has not been seriously
considered by the Montana Court and only one case has been
decided under it." If the same interpretation is given this section as has been given Section 12214, then a defendant under
judgment of death must be considered insane by the sheriff,
the judge and the jury before judgment can be stayed.
C.

THE RIGHT OF THE DEPENDENT TO A JURY TRIAL WHERE

THE ISSUE IS RAISED PRIOR TO THE TRIAL.

A substantial procedural problem is created by Section
10728, Revised Codes of Montana, 1935. Prior to 1925, if a
defendant introduced a reasonable doubt as to his sanity at the
time of the commission of the offense, he was entitled to an
acquittal.' In 1925, for the primary purpose of requiring the
defendant to establish his insanity by a preponderance of the
evidence, subdivision 2 of Section 10728 was added. It reads:
"When the commission of the act charged as a crime is
proven, and the defense sought to be established is the insanity of the defendant, the same must be proven by the
defendant by a preponderance of the testimony; provided,
however, that said defendant may have his sanity or insanity determined in the manner provided by law, by requesting the district court to determine the same, at any
time before the jury is obtained." (Italics supplied.)
It is not clear whether the italicized portion of the quoted
subdivision relates to the present insanity of the defendant or
to his insanity at the time of the commission of the offense.
Since the remaining portion of the subdivision deals with the
defense of insanity, that is, the capacity to commit the crime,
it might be supposed that the entire subdivision deals with the
same subject and that it was the intention of the legislature to
require a defendant who wished to defend on the ground of
insanity to advise the court of that intention prior to the empaneling of the jury. If this is the meaning of the language
in question, then nothing was accomplished by it. .The right
to defend on the ground of insanity existed prior to 1925 and
no new legislation was needed to secure that right to a defendant. On the other hand, if it was intended to require a defendant to announce his intention to plead the defense of insanity,
the language of the subdivision does not accomplish this since
the words used are entirely permissive and do not even by im"State v. Vettere, supra.
"State v. Brooks (1899) 23 Mont. 146, 57 Pae. 1038.
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plication indicate that a defendant is barred from the defense
if advance notice is not given. Such a purpose could have
been accomplished by very explicit language and it is thought
that such would have been used had the legislature intended
such a radical change in well established rules of criminal
procedure.
Because the quoted language, if used in the sense above
mentioned, accomplishes very little and because the language
"may have his sanity or insanity determined in the manner
provided by law" seems to refer to something other than the
submission of the capacity to entertain a criminal intent to
the trial jury, it is the opinion of the author that the language
in question relates to the defendant's capacity to be tried.
If this is the proper construction, still more serious problems remain. Does the defendant have an absolute right to
have the jury pass upon the issue of present capacity if a timely request is made? The answer to the question depends upon
the construction to be placed upon Sections 10728 and 12214.
The former provides that the court must determine the
sanity issue according to law. Section 12213 to 12217 provide
the only procedure for the trial of the insanity issue. What
then does the word "determination," used in both sections,
mean? Does a judge in passing on the question of a doubt
determine the issue of insanity? Pragmatically he does under
the decisions of our court. Theoretically, however, a judge's
function is preliminary and procedural and is limited to the
question of whether there is a bona fide issue of insanity which
should be determined by a jury. It seems to be the legislative
intention that the question of insanity should be passed upon
by a jury. Since the issue can be raised at any time, orderly
procedure would require that trials be not constantly interrupted by groundless claims of insanity. Hence the court
was given the right as a preliminary matter to decide whether
there was an issue. This is not a right to determine the issue,
but only to determine if there is a bona fide issue which should
be submitted to the jury. When the issue arises, i.e., when
there is a doubt as to the sanity, the judge theoretically has no
power to refuse to submit it to the jury. If this be true, then
the words "determined in the manner provided by law" used
in Section 10728, mean a determination by a jury since no
other method of determination is provided for. This is true,
of course, only where a timely request is made, and in other
cases, the defendant is required to raise a doubt in the mind
of the trial judge.
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Such a construction reaches a workable result, since the
orderly processes of trial would not be disrupted if the sanity
issue were in all cases submitted to a jury before the trial of
the main issue.
D. THE BURDEN OF PROOF.
The statutes do not allocate the burden of proof nor
define it in proceedings to determine the present capacity of
the defendant. Section 10728, Subd. 2, which refers to the
defense of insanity is not applicable, but it is probable that
a similar result would be reached by the application of general
principles. The general presumption of sanity" is sufficient
to place the burden of proof on the defendant. The statutes
seem to contemplate this by allowing the defendant to open
the ease and close the argument.?
Since the inquisition into the sanity of the defendant is
not at this stage of the proceedings related to his guilt or innocence, the defendant should be required to prove his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence."
E.

CONCURRENCE IN THE VERDICT.

While Section 12215 is quite explicit in some details, it
neglects tomention the number of jurors who must concur in
a verdict. The question arises whether a concurrence of twelve
as in felony cases or eight as in misdemeanor cases is required. The constitution 7 provides no help, since it uses the
words "civil actions" and "criminal actions not amounting
to a felony", and nowhere mentions this type of proceeding.
The provision of the penal code relating to jury verdicts" uses
similar language. 'The sections of the Code of Civil Procedure
contain no language which throw light upon this problem.'
One method of resolving the problem is by reference to the
common law. At common law the concurrence of twelve jurors
was required.'
"Sommerville v. Greenhood (1922) 65 Mont. 101, 210 Pac. 1048; In re
Harper's Estate (1934) 98 Mont. 356, 40 Pac. (2d) 51; Hier v. Farmer's Mutual Fire Insurance Company (1937) 104 Mont. 471, 67 Pac.
(2d) 831; In re Murphy's Estate (1911) 43 Mont. 353, 116 Pac. 1004.
-R.C.M. 1935, 112215.
"U. S. v. Chlsolm (1906) 149 Fed. 284; Jordan v. State (1911) 124 Tenn.
81, 135 S.W. 327, 34 L.R.A. (n. s.) 1115.
"MONT. CoNsT. Art. I1, §23.
"R.C.M. 1935, 111929.
"Chapter 19, COnE oF CIVIL PxocuuE of 1935.
"*This technique Is somewhat analogous to that used in determining
kinds of cases in which the right to trial by jury exists as a constitutional right. Chessman v. Hale (1905) 31 Mont. 577, 79 Pac. 254;
State ex rel Jackson v. Kennie (1900) 24 Mont. 45, 60 Pac. 589.
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